In recent years, the global security landscape has undergone profound changes, and low altitude security threats have shown diversified and diffuse characteristics. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, drone attack and defense have become an important form of modern warfare, and low-cost unmanned equipment has frequently broken through the traditional air defense network in the Palestinian Israeli region; What is even more alarming is that civilian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) "black flying" incidents have repeatedly endangered key infrastructure such as airports and nuclear power plants, highlighting the accelerating infiltration of low altitude security threats from the military field to the public safety field. In this context, "low altitude defense" has evolved from a professional military term to a core issue of international security.

From a historical perspective, the development of low altitude defense technology is closely related to the evolution of warfare forms. During World War II, the challenge of detecting low altitude breakthrough targets gave rise to revolutionary technologies such as Doppler radar; During the Cold War, in response to the threat of Soviet strategic bombers, NATO promoted the integrated development of air defense systems. The emergence of short-range missile systems such as the US Hawker and French Roland marked the beginning of a networked defense system consisting of mobile air defense platforms and electronic warfare systems. However, the incident of German youth flying light aircraft into Red Square at low altitude in 1987 and the case of drone "bee colony" repeatedly breaking through the traditional defense line in the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 jointly reveal the inherent defects of the traditional air defense system in the field of low altitude.

Since the 21st century, the leap in computer and communication technology has driven a qualitative change in low altitude defense systems. The modern system has achieved the networked integration of multi-source data such as radar, optoelectronics, and electronic warfare, and the collaborative interception capability of automatic artillery and missile systems has been significantly improved. However, at the same time, the proliferation of drone and ballistic missile technology has enabled dozens of countries around the world to possess relevant capabilities, and low altitude threats exhibit dual characteristics of "lowered technological barriers" and "reduced combat costs". More seriously, the commercialization of technologies such as stealth materials and electronic interference poses unprecedented security challenges to critical infrastructure and large-scale public events. In this situation, low altitude defense is not only a military capability, but also a strategic pillar for maintaining national security and social stability.

In this issue of "Ningdian Interview", Zhou Feng, General Manager of Qingqiao Defense, was invited to explore in depth how to build a low altitude defense system that meets the requirements of the new era from the perspectives of technological evolution and application scenarios, focusing on the theme of "low altitude defense", and providing a solid barrier for low altitude security.

What is low altitude defense? What air threats does the low altitude defense system mainly target for protection? What specific risks are currently the focus of prevention in civilian scenarios?

Zhou Feng: Low altitude defense is a comprehensive safety protection system for unauthorized aircraft in airspace below 3000 meters, with a focus on unmanned aerial vehicles. This system needs to integrate technologies such as radar, radio monitoring, electro-optical identification, and electronic countermeasures to build a closed-loop capability of "detection identification disposal". For example, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Palestinian Israeli conflict, drone warfare is becoming more and more common, and the demand for defense is also greater. Although there are few applications in the civilian field, the risks are still worth paying attention to.

In the field of civil security, there are three significant characteristics of key prevention targets. Firstly, the risk of drone intrusion in airport airspace is particularly prominent. According to data from the International Civil Aviation Organization, in 2018two thousand and twenty-fourThe annual average growth rate of global airport drone interference incidents reached 47%, posing a serious threat to aviation safety; Secondly, the demand for critical infrastructure protection has surged, and key facilities such as nuclear power plants and oil and gas pipelines are facing risks of drone reconnaissance and attacks; Thirdly, the security of large-scale events is facing new challenges, as drones may be used to create panic or carry out terrorist attacks.

It is worth noting that with technological advancements, threat forms are rapidly evolving: the payload capacity of commercial drones is increasing, open-source flight control is becoming more popular, andAITechnological applications make autonomous attacks possible. These changes drive the upgrade of low altitude defense from hardware interception to intelligent early warning and active defense systems, requiring the strengthening of multi technology integration and rapid response capabilities to address new challenges to low altitude security.

What is the core boundary point between low altitude defense in the military and civilian fields?

Zhou Feng: Low altitude defense is the core dividing point between military and civilian fields, stemming from the fundamental difference between technological means and target protection. In military scenarios, the battlefield environment is complex and the intensity of confrontation is high. Defense measures emphasize "hard confrontation" and require the use of highly lethal technologies such as explosive bombs, microwave interference, and laser strikes. The goal is to quickly destroy enemy drones and ensure battlefield safety. The equipment forms also show significant differences, with military equipment placing more emphasis on practical effectiveness.

In the civilian field, the focus is on "risk management", with the core being to prevent accidents or malicious events caused by drones, such as airport clearance zone intrusion, government building spy photography, and large-scale event interference. Although such threats may not necessarily have military aggressiveness, they can easily trigger panic or security incidents. Therefore, civilian defense must follow the principle of "non lethal".

In short, the military focuses on "confrontation" and pursues rapid destruction; Civilian use emphasizes compliance control with the essence of "prevention". Balancing security requirements and regulatory constraints under restrictive conditions, technological means focus more on early warning and interference rather than direct destruction.

What breakthrough advantages does modern low altitude defense technology have compared to traditional defense methods?

Zhou Feng: Modern low altitude defense technology has achieved significant breakthroughs, forming a complete "three line defense" system. This system is like building three intelligent lines of defense: deploying a wide area detection network for remote warning in the outer 10 kilometers, using electronic interference and other soft killing methods in the middle 3-5 kilometers, and using it in the inner 1 kilometerIntercept using hard killing methodsThis layered defense architecture enables precise interception of low altitude threats in all directions and at multiple levels.

In addition, with the improvement of these technologies and performance, the defense concept is undergoing fundamental innovation, and the traditional "high cost versus low cost" consumption war mode is being replaced by a new paradigm of "precision defense achieved through intelligence". For example, the AI decision-making center installed in the system cansub-secondThe completion of target recognition, threat assessment, and interception plan formulation, with response speed and decision-making accuracy far exceeding manual capabilities, marks the official entry of low altitude defense into the intelligent era.

Thirdly, in the field of civil security, the new defense system effectively fills the protection gap of traditional security systems in the low altitude dimension. Effectively respond to the threat of consumer grade drone modification for key facilities such as nuclear power plants and high-speed rail lines, and form a three-dimensional protection network with existing security systems.

Its core value lies in improving defense efficiency through a layered architecture, relying on intelligent technology to achieve precise and rapid response, and using specialized solutions to compensate for the shortcomings of traditional security in the low altitude dimension. In the current context of drone technology diffusion, such technology has become a key supplement to ensuring the safety of key targets.

What common challenges do you observe in the construction of low altitude defense systems due to the intensification of global conflicts and frequent incidents of civilian drone "black flying"?

Zhou Feng: Currently, civilian low altitude defense faces two core challenges: firstly, the effectiveness of defense measures is limited. Due to safety regulations and technical standards, the available defense measures are limited, and there is a significant gap in the effective disposal of unauthorized aircraft worldwide.

Secondly, the performance of the detection and tracking system is insufficient. Traditional monitoring equipment has shortcomings in both detection accuracy and response speed when facing small high-speed targets such as time traveling aircraft. Even if the target is detected, it is difficult to track the trajectory stably, and the "discovery lock" chain breaks, directly affecting the overall defense effectiveness. Especially when facing highly maneuverable and small flying targets, the response of the existing technical system lags behind significantly.

These bottlenecks reflect the core contradiction of low altitude defense: how to enhance the ability to quickly respond to various low altitude threats under the premise of safety and compliance. To solve this problem, it is necessary to achieve full chain innovation from sensor networks, intelligent algorithms to interception technology, and break through the capability boundaries of the current technological system.

With the development of technology and the improvement of the system, what new application scenarios do you think low altitude defense technology will break through?

Zhou Feng: From the current application perspective, breakthroughs in low altitude defense technology will first focus on high-value targets and the protection of large public facilities. High value target protection mainly refers to "important locations" such as prisons and nuclear power plants, as well as "key points" such as important personnel residences and accompanying routes. As a key area of security protection, with the popularization of drone technology, it is easy to become a target for destructive attacks.

The protection of large-scale public facilities includes strategic projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and the Yajiang Hydropower Station, as well as transportation arteries along high-speed railways. Once damaged by drones, the consequences can be severe. However, the protection of such scenarios needs to address practical issues: institutional mechanisms need to be synchronized and improved with technological products, such as defining the scope of protection, clarifying disposal permissions, standardizing disposal processes, and forming a closed loop with "hard devices" in order to achieve effective protection.

Tianjin Airport 'Black Flight'The drone incident has exposed the urgent need for personal safety and public facility protection, forcing low altitude defense technology to prioritize landing in such scenarios - this is both a "test field" for technology verification and a "main battlefield" for market demand.

In addition, the linkage between low altitude economy and low altitude defense is also worth paying attention to. With the increase in low altitude openness, safety risks have become increasingly prominent - just like with more cars, traffic management must keep up. Future low altitude defense not only needs to "prevent destruction", but also needs to "ensure operation". This balance between "prevention" and "use" will promote the upgrading of low altitude defense from a "safety barrier" to a "low altitude ecological guardian", giving rise to more integrated application scenarios.

How are low altitude economy and low altitude defense developing in tandem now?

Zhou Feng: Currently, the integration of low altitude economy and low altitude defense has become an important direction for industry development. China is vigorously promoting the development of low altitude economy, accelerating the popularization of applications such as drone delivery, air travel, emergency rescue, etc. However, the accompanying security risks are becoming increasingly prominent - drone loss of control, system intrusion and destruction, interception of high-value material transportation, etc., which have similarities with the problem of "black flying".

Specifically, the integration of the two is mainly reflected in two levels. Firstly, there is a fundamental need for 'anti destruction'. Drone delivery routes cover low altitudes in cities, and if maliciously exploited (such as system intrusion, manipulation, and collision of sensitive targets), the consequences may be more serious than ordinary "black flying". Therefore, low altitude defense technology needs to be deeply integrated with the delivery system - for example, by loading countermeasures such as jammers and deception devices onto delivery drones, it can not only ensure its own transportation safety, but also deter illegal drones in the surrounding area, equivalent to equipping each delivery drone with a "security guard".

The second is the demand for "ensuring operation". The development of low altitude economy needs to solve the problem of "daring to fly and being able to fly". To cover more areas for delivery, it is necessary to plan routes and identify no fly zones. At this time, low altitude defense monitoring systems (radar, electro-optical equipment) can detect airspace in real time to help delivery drones avoid illegal intruders or no fly zones, avoiding safety accidents caused by accidental entry. The essence of this "defense+application" linkage is to build a "safety efficiency" closed loop: defense technology safeguards the low altitude economy, and the scale of low altitude economy in turn promotes the scenario based innovation of defense technology.

In short, the low altitude economy and low altitude defense are not mutually reinforcing, but rather a mutually empowering relationship. In the future, with the deepening of low altitude economy (such as manned commuting and emergency rescue), the demand for defense technology will be more refined - from "preventing external attacks" to "ensuring internal operations", from "single point defense" to "systematic coordination", the cross fusion of the two will only become increasingly close.

What is the future development direction of civil low altitude defense?

Zhou Feng: The future development direction of low altitude defense can be understood from two aspects: "continuation of the current situation" and "breakthrough direction". The current civilian anti drone mainly relies on soft means such as deception and interference, and the market is mature but the effect is limited. It can only force the drone to lose control or make an emergency landing; In addition, the "no anti no" mode, such as using capture drones to intercept and rotor drones to approach and interfere, overly relies on manual control, with insufficient accuracy in evaluation and operation, resulting in a lower success rate.

What are the possible breakthrough points in the future? I think there are several directions. Firstly, there is a systematic upgrade that combines software and hardware. Integrate existing interference and deception devices with miniaturized, low-cost targeted energy equipment and other hard strike methods onto the same platform, forming a closed loop of "interference positioning first - then precise strike". For example, the mobile safe house being developed by Qingqiao Defense has integrated monitoring, interference, and hard strike modules into a mobile system that can be deployed and used directly without complex debugging. This systematic solution will be the mainstream in the future.

Next is the optimization of technical costs. The core bottleneck of civilian popularization of hard strike methods (such as lasers) is the high costAnd there are certain security risks involved.Through technological iteration, such as the use of more efficient power systems and more compact optical structures, costs can be reduced and high-performance interception devices can be promoted on a large scale. This will significantly enhance the level of low altitude defense capabilities in the civilian field, making every scenario that requires protection "worthy and usable".

In addition, breakthroughs in intelligent guidance technology are also crucial. In response to the problem of relying on manual labor for "no anti no", in the future, AI recognition combined with automatic navigation can be used to achieve autonomous tracking and interception of counter drones, greatly improving accuracy. Of course, this requires the support of algorithms and computing power, but with the development of AI technology, this direction is predictable.

Overall, the future of low altitude defense does not rely on a single "black technology", but on the systematic integration, cost optimization, and intelligent upgrading of existing technologies. The trend will shift from "single point defense" to "system defense", from "military exclusive" to "military civilian integration", and build a comprehensive and intelligent security protection system in the low altitude field.